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to describe mental models that might underwrite a “next system”; and (c) relating a public policy case 
study from Buffalo, NY, in which a City-run program was redesigned to be a vehicle for bottom-up 
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As community-based organizations like PUSH Buffalo4 and 
others5 are demonstrating the possibilities of alternative systems 
in specific geographic places, the questions of (1) how to bring 
those efforts to scale, and (2) how public policies might change 
in response to the lessons learned from those efforts, require 
greater attention. Building on the previous installment of this series, 
the remainder of this report engages with aspects of these two 
questions by: (a) further unpacking some of the mental models 
(i.e., beliefs, values, and goals6) that define the current economic 
system; (b) summarizing and synthesizing selected ideas from the 
literature to describe mental models that might underwrite a “next 
system”7; and (c) relating a public policy case study from Buffalo, 
NY, in which a City-run program was redesigned to be a vehicle 
for bottom-up community empowerment as opposed to a tool 
for top-down command-and-control. The case study shows how 
the program redesign implicitly reflects, and explicitly embraces, 
some of the “next system” mental models that are outlined below.8 
For these and other reasons, the program has received (inter9)
national recognition,10 and researchers have argued that it might 
offer budding insights for how local governments can begin 
reorienting their existing policies away from goals of growth that 
support the status quo, and toward goals of equity and community 
wealth-building that can lead to systems-change.11 Although 
the incremental nature of such actions might seem decidedly 
mismatched to the intimidating scale of systems-change, what 
matters is that the policy illustrates that local governments—and not 
INTRODUCTION 
The first two parts of this series argued that patterns of spatial inequality are not 
accidents, nor are they temporary aberrations. Rather, they are the logical results 
of a prevailing political economic system that puts profits ahead of people and 
planet—a system where capital comes before labor,1 development gets conflated 
with fantasies of limitless growth,2 and privileged actors retain disproportionate 
shares of power, both through active exercises of that power and passive failures 
to use it in ways that advance the rights and wealth of the less empowered.3 As a 
consequence, Erasing Red Lines of discrimination and inequality from our map is 
a monumental task that will require transformational systems-change. 
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just visionary community-based organizations—have the capacity to 
act, in the here and now, in ways that are more consistent with, and 
potentially prefigure, a “next system” characterized by a democratic 
economy that works for all persons and respects nature and the 
limits that it places on growth.
Moving from Global Growth to Local Wealth 
BACKGROUND FOR POLICY WONKS (FOR EVERYONE ELSE, SKIP TO 
THE NEXT SECTION!)
As implicated in Part 2 of this series, the prevailing economic 
system and model of economic development in the United States 
embraces a pro-growth logic and bias that overwhelmingly favors 
market-based and oversimplified command-and-control solutions 
to complex social problems. This bias is born out of mental models 
that endorse several assumptions about people and firms and how 
they participate in economic activities. Among those assumptions 
are that:
•  Economic agents (e.g., individuals, firms, and governments) are 
rational, informed, and self-interested. They are aware of the costs 
and benefits of alternative choices, and they choose only those 
strategies that maximize their own well-being. Rather than acting 
as socially minded persons-in-communities,12 people act strictly in 
their individual self-interests.
•  What drives economic decision-making among rational, 
individualistic economic agents is a desire for accumulation. That 
is, economic agents (people, firms, governments) are assumed to 
always want more of something, and that something is universally 
linked to [financial] capital.13 
•  In the absence of high transaction costs and the presence of well-
defined property rights, market exchange produces an efficient 
allocation of resources. More precisely, given a distribution of 
resources across a population of rational economic agents, 
competition in unregulated markets moves society—as if being led 
by an “invisible hand”—to an outcome in which no one agent can be 
made better off without reducing the welfare of another agent. 
•  The competition created by this market-based, “invisible hand” 
style of economic organization is good for society, insofar as it (1) 
maximizes the total size of the economic pie, and (2) allocates the 
...local governments 
can begin reorienting 
their existing policies 
away from goals of 
growth that support 
the status quo, and 
toward goals of equity 
and community 
wealth-building that 
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slices of that pie to their “highest and best uses,” as reflected by 
where they fetch the highest prices that rational actors are willing 
to pay for them. Under such a system, it is assumed that only and 
all mutually beneficial transactions occur, as rational, informed, 
and self-interested actors would never voluntarily participate in 
transactions that were harmful to them. 
The preceding assumptions, which are grounded in neoclassical 
economic theory, have guided American economic and social policy, 
as well as urban development strategies, since at least the 1970s.14 
As noted in Part 2, they have informed a widespread ideology 
which holds that government’s role in society ought to be limited 
to protecting private property rights and supporting the creation 
and functioning of private markets. Government intervention 
is therefore justified only when it is intended to correct “market 
failures” and strengthen the institution of private property15—in other 
words, government’s charge is to help facilitate the goal of capital 
accumulation. As such, the preponderance of public interventions in 
cases of neighborhood distress and decline have been somewhat 
predicable in their pro-market orientations. The most common of 
these Low Road interventions include: 
•  “Order policing,” whereby cities issue summonses, citations, and 
fines for conditions of blight and disorder16—e.g., broken windows, 
overgrown grass, graffiti, vagrancy, etc.—that detract from nearby 
property values. Such strategies are notoriously regressive, insofar 
as they disparately impact low income and homeless residents;17
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•  Lot-clearing, or large-scale demolition of eyesore properties, 
is typically done not with context-sensitive reuse plans for the 
resulting vacant lots in mind, but with expectations that real 
estate investors will be attracted to the development opportunities 
presented by “blank slate” parcels in targeted neighborhoods;18
•  Tax foreclosure followed by private market auctions is used to 
dispose of abandoned properties and put them in the hands of 
private owners (typically investors);19 and
•  A variety of tax incentives and subsidies are offered for private 
development projects. This strategy is regularly referred to as a 
“race to the bottom” for its willingness to trade valuable public 
resources, in competitions with other places, to “win” development 
projects that create disproportionately many private benefits.20 
On occasion, these subsidized initiatives take the form of large-
scale, property-led developments such as “signature” buildings21 or 
similar interventions that offer a sense of “spectacle.”22
The common thread running through these strategies is a belief 
that “market intervention in the material circumstances of poor…
communities will…lead to community change.” This expectation 
is grounded in the market-fundamentalist misconception that 
distressed neighborhoods can only be revitalized through a 
“redistribution of capital resources.”  More specifically, the logic 
goes that distressed neighborhoods experience positive change 
when public “bads” like blight and property abandonment are taxed 
(disincentivized), and public “goods” like economic development 
projects and real estate investments are subsidized (incentivized). 
Such a logic exhibits evident pro-growth and pro-capital biases—at 
bottom, it holds up economic growth as an unambiguous public 
“good,” even when growth facilitates private wealth accumulation 
without regard for, or even at the expense of, collective community 
wealth.24 To use terminology that has been introduced and used 
throughout this series of reports, the mental models of the existing 
system give rise to a structure on which growth regularly takes 
precedence over development. Because the [financial] capital that 
fuels growth flows into, out of, and through geographic spaces at 
uneven rates, this system inevitably produces patterns of spatial 
inequality. In turn, spatial inequality is viewed as a “market failure” 
that can be remedied through market-based interventions aimed at 
catalyzing growth and enhancing the economic competitiveness of 
Because the [financial] 
capital that fuels 
growth flows into, 
out of, and through 
geographic spaces 
at uneven rates, this 
system inevitably 
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distressed places. Neighborhoods, as it were, are treated as discrete 
units that have value to potential investors. By intervening to make 
distressed neighborhoods more attractive to would-be investors, the 
neighborhood wins…or so the story goes. 
Community Development as Community Wealth-
Building
The reality of the situation laid out above is that a system built 
for economic competition between self-interested agents gets 
competition between self-interested agents. The map serves as a 
venue for doing battle, and the geographies of discrimination and 
uneven opportunity that arise on it are the scars we incur in the 
process. Market-based tools can potentially put bandages over 
some of those scars—but they can neither prevent them nor take 
them away. To create substantive change, it is therefore necessary 
to put down the first aid kit of the pro-growth event promoters, and 
to pick up the whistle and the rulebook of the referee. We need to 
call the fight, diagnose the scars for what they are and how they 
came to be, and begin to heal the whole body so that it may function 
as the collective that it is. In these respects, as a starting point for 
changing the mental models that guide contemporary, growth-
oriented economic development, practitioners and policymakers 
might look to their counterparts in the bottom-up field of community 
development.
Ron Shaffer and colleagues observed that “economic development 
and community development have been two distinct and separate 
concepts” for most of their existence. Whereas economic 
development has historically focused on “jobs, income, and 
business growth”, community development has focused on “equal 
rights, institutional organization, and political processes, among 
others.”25 In other words, while economic development has pursued 
economic growth through market mechanisms, community 
development has pursued systems-change through tactics and 
strategies aimed at altering the prevailing power relations in a 
community. Thus, despite their similar sounding names, the two 
camps have historically operated from different bases, built atop 
different mental models. The remainder of this section briefly 
unpacks some of the mental models associated with community 
development. Echoing Shaffer and his coauthors, until Low Road 
economic development is upended and resituated on these or 
To create substantive 
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related High Road mental models, the prospects for an equitable, 
sustainable, and democratic economy—at any spatial or temporal 
scale—are bleak at best.26
What is Community Development?
Community development is both a process and an outcome.27 As 
a process, it is a “participatory effort to mobilize community assets 
that increases the capacity of residents to improve their quality of 
life.”28 As an outcome, community development is a realization of 
these participatory efforts. That is, community-development-as-
outcome is positive community change that is embodied in the 
enhanced will or capacity of residents to undertake collective action, 
and/or in tangible, resident-driven improvements to local quality of 
life.29
Although the preceding definitions suggest that community 
development can occur anywhere, at a variety of scales, most 
practitioners, policymakers, and funders who work in the field 
argue that, as an intervention, its aim is to empower disadvantaged 
residents and neighborhoods.30 As such, the process of community 
development can be recast as “integrating disadvantaged [residents] 
into the local economy to create community wealth.”31 The result 
of this inclusive process, community-development-as-outcome 
(i.e., positive community change), is thus measured “in terms of…
[residents] gaining the skills and confidence…to overcome social 
barriers to economic success, and community institutions making…
decisions and resource commitments that help sustain [and 
reinforce]…[these outcomes].”32 
The 2019 Turkey Giveaway 
organized by Greater Eastside 
Fields of Dreams Block Club 
Association Inc. gave away 179 
turkeys.
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On that backdrop, the first key difference between the mental 
models of conventional economic development and community 
development lies in their ends, or their ultimate goals. As argued 
throughout this series of reports, conventional economic 
development works toward goals of growth and maximizing the 
total size of the economy, regardless of distribution. The means 
employed in pursuit of that growth—particularly property rights and 
market-based allocation—pit individual economic agents against 
one another in endless competition that results in persistent and 
widening inequality. By contrast, community development works 
toward the goal(s) of maximizing shared community wealth and 
ensuring that wealth is equitably distributed among residents and 
between communities. 
What is Community Wealth?
Community wealth is the “stock of all assets, net of liabilities, that 
can contribute to the well-being” of a community.33 Another term 
for ‘assets’ is capital.34 In everyday and economic development 
language, the term capital is regularly used to denote financial 
assets—for example, “funds held in deposit accounts and/or 
funds obtained from special financing sources.” The term is also 
“associated with capital assets of a company [e.g., equipment and 
buildings] which require significant amounts of [money] to finance or 
expand.”35
Crucially, this common conception of capital as money, or as 
marketable assets that have monetary value and that can enable 
economic agents to make more money, suffers from the same 
pro-market, pro-growth biases that inform so much economic 
development work in the U.S. In that sense, it is not surprising that 
widely used government interventions in distressed communities 
and regions tend to target capital in this narrow view (see 
“Background for Policy Wonks” above). Indeed, from fines and 
citations on individual property owners,36 to tax incentives and 
subsidies for developers,37 and onto capital infrastructure projects 
that connect local communities to global marketplaces,38 the go-to 
public fixes for spatial inequality tend to think of and define success 
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Counter to this narrow view of capital as financial and tangible 
physical assets, community development practitioners and 
researchers generally conceive of capital in multiple, interdependent 
dimensions. In this view, community wealth is not synonymous with 
numerical dollar values—it is instead more closely related to the 
qualitative notion of well-being. It is the total tangible and intangible 
value of all of the community’s assets, net of liabilities, and the 
extent to which that value is evenly distributed among persons and 
locations within the community. 
As a tool for thinking about community wealth in this broader sense, 
Flora and colleagues developed their highly-regarded community 
capitals framework (CCF).40 In brief, the CCF argues that all spatial 
communities, irrespective of their social and economic statuses, 
possess varying degrees of seven types of capital, or assets (see 
Figure 1). At the center of the framework, where all seven forms of 
capital exist in relative abundance, work together, and are evenly 
distributed among community members, places are said to possess 
high degrees of community wealth. In this comparatively “next 
systems” view, wealthy communities are not necessarily those 
where income or property values reach the highest of heights; rather, 
they are the communities that are characterized by: (1) livability 
(high quality of life for all residents); (2) sustainability (ecological 
health and integrity); (3) equity (even distributions of resources, 
wealth, and (dis)amenities); and (4) economic vibrancy (good jobs 
that pay living wages for all members of the local labor force).41
Having presented the CCF’s overarching vision of community wealth 
(Fig. 1), the constituent forms of capital that contribute to that 
wealth are defined as follows:
A community Thanksgiving 
meal being shared at West Side 
Community Services. 
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        1. NATURAL CAPITAL is the air, water, land, terrain, weather, and biodiversity that both support 
and put limits on all life.
        2. CULTURAL CAPITAL is the shared worldview of a group of people. It gives identity to, and 
defines the appropriate and expected behaviors for, members of a social group.
        3. HUMAN CAPITAL is the set of individual attributes (e.g., health, education, skills) that 
contributes to an individual’s ability to earn a living and contribute to society.
        4. SOCIAL CAPITAL is the concatenation of social networks and their norms of mutual trust and 
reciprocity that facilitate collective action.
        5. POLITICAL CAPITAL is the ability of groups with shared values to influence decision-making 
and the distribution of local resources in accordance with group values. 
        6. FINANCIAL CAPITAL is the savings, income, tax revenues, credits, grants, and other, generally 
monetary, resources within a community.
        7. BUILT CAPITAL is human-constructed infrastructure.43
FIGURE 1
The community capitals framework 
(CCF) [Source: Flora et al. (2018)42]
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According to Flora and her colleagues, these seven forms 
of capital are all interlinked and subject to positive feedback 
effects.44 Consequently, depletion of one capital stock may lead 
to depletion in one or more other capital stocks, as is often the 
case in postindustrial, “shrinking” cities.45 Likewise, uncoordinated 
and scattershot investments that do not leverage the connections 
between the seven types of capital—for example, a subsidized 
development project geared toward outside interests, like those 
of the “creative class,” rather than toward existing residents46— are 
unlikely to fit in with, and meaningfully increase broadly shared 
wealth within, targeted communities.47 
The other side of this story is that well-designed, strategic 
investments into multiple community capitals might be capable of 
Erasing Red Lines, or reversing “vicious cycles,” of neighborhood 
decline.48 Toward that end, the second key difference between 
the mental models of conventional economic development and 
community development lies in their means, or their preferred 
intervention strategies. Whereas conventional economic 
development prioritizes investments into financial and built capital 
stocks—often without regard for how those investments might (not) 
influence or interact with other, less tangible stocks of capital49—
community development recognizes that financial and built capital 
assets only build community wealth when local residents have the 
power and capacity to work together to decide how those assets 
should be used.50 In other words, community development puts less 
tangible capital assets on relatively equal footing as more tangible 
assets; and its interventions strive to invest in all of these capital 
stocks in ways that build on one another in pursuit of upwardly 
spiraling, collective community wealth.51 
The remainder of this report relates a case study of a multipronged 
community development effort in Buffalo, NY that is now, following 
a substantive overhaul, arguably consistent with this aim. Critically, 
as a City-run initiative, the case study demonstrates that local 
governments have the ability to design, or creatively redesign, 
programs in ways that (1) replace business-as-usual mental models 
of conventional economic development with those of community 
development, and, in doing so, (2) prioritize the production of 
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Case Study: Buffalo, NY Operation Clean Sweep
The City of Buffalo, NY operates a “clean sweep” program in 
which the local government makes multiple sequential and 
coordinated investments into targeted areas, on a block-by-block 
basis.52 The program was first created in name in 2001, and it 
involved dispatching law enforcement officers and other officials 
to selected neighborhoods, unannounced. Among other things, 
officers knocked on doors and asked for permission to inspect 
houses. While secondary aspects of the program involved cleaning 
vacant lots, collecting trash, and installing smoke detectors, the 
strong law enforcement presence and top-down nature of the 
clean sweep was described by the New York Civil Liberties Union 
(NYCLU) as “warrantless searches” and an “overzealous exercise 
of police power.”53 Local observers called it a “heavy-handed fishing 
expedition,”54 and residents who experienced clean sweeps later 
wrote that they felt intimidated and considered the events to be 
invasions of privacy.55 Despite these critiques, some residents 
warmed to the effort, claiming that the sweeps encouraged people 
to become engaged in their neighborhoods.56
While impressions of the outcomes from the early sweeps were 
therefore mixed, there was wider agreement that the top-down 
process of the program was flawed and inappropriate.57 For 
that reason, in 2006, newly elected Mayor Byron Brown began 
overhauling the operation to make it more of a community-based 
initiative. In his first year in office, Brown experimented with the 
clean sweep process by adding new components and involving 
local block club leaders and community-based organizations 
from the outset.58 New features included distributing information 
on “employment opportunities, job training, drug rehabilitation 
programs and other human services.”59 
The success of these 2006 experiments resulted in a permanent 
program expansion in 2007, in terms of both the number of clean 
sweeps completed annually and the number and diversity of 
partners involved in each sweep. While local nongovernmental 
leaders voiced ongoing concern early in Brown’s tenure about the 
“surprise” nature of the sweeps and the continued involvement of 
law enforcement,60 residents appeared to have few complaints 
about the program by the end of Brown’s second year in charge. 
According to Brown, residents embraced (and continue to embrace) 
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the initiative because it empowered (empowers) them to get 
involved in community life.61 As the program grows and evolves, 
residents continue to offer positive feedback, remarking in recent 
years that “we need [the clean sweep]”,62 and that it is “a good thing” 
that helps to stabilize neighborhoods.63 
With these points in mind, what does the new clean sweep program 
do? According to observers: 
        “[o]n a given day, [teams]…remove litter, debris and graffiti; fill 
potholes; prune trees; mow overgrown lots; repair street lights; 
set rat traps; and seal vacant houses. They provide employment 
and health care services, install smoke detectors, check that 
housing codes are being met, establish neighborhood watch 
programs and create relationships with community members. 
Volunteers pass out oral hygiene bags and test blood pressure. 
Even utility providers participate”.64
Moreover:
        “[f]ollowing each sweep, a…[t]eam revisits each block and an 
extensive after-care program goes into effect. During sweeps, 
residents are questioned if there are any other issues where 
they could use assistance. After the sweep, the Division 
analyses this data to determine additional ways that the city can 
provide support. The Division also works with residents…after 
a sweep to establish block clubs and neighborhood watches 
to give ownership and a sense of pride back to the revitalized 
community.”65
Starting in 2018, additional features were integrated to help 
“[strengthen] community-police relationships” and build trust 
between communities and law enforcement.66 Among other things, 
police officers now team with nonprofit representatives to engage 
residents—especially children—in soccer games and music-filled 
cookouts as clean sweep activities unfold on their blocks.67 These 
events give officers opportunities to connect personally with folks 
in the neighborhood, which, according to one police lieutenant, 
“open[s] the door” for productive two-way communication and 
collaborations between residents and the police going forward.68
Community events give 
officers opportunities 
to connect personally 
with folks in the 
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Based on the above descriptions, it is reasonable to argue that a 
Brown-era clean sweep invests, in various ways, into all seven forms 
of community capital from the CCF (Fig. 1). For instance: 
•  beautifying the urban commons by removing litter and overgrowth 
from vacant lots and pruning trees in public rights of way are 
investments into natural capital;
•  mending relationships between communities and the police, as 
well as promoting the importance of monitoring neighborhood 
activity and reporting issues—both of which demonstrate 
to residents that they can contribute to community-based 
governance—constitutes an investment into cultural capital; 
•  providing employment resources and healthcare services are 
investments into human capital;
•  working to set up neighborhood watches and block clubs 
facilitates the creation of social capital;
•  sending teams of public decision-makers—including the Mayor 
himself—door-to-door to listen to residents’ concerns can give 
those residents a stronger voice in government, which may 
enhance the community’s political capital;
•  distributing resources to residents, such as smoke detectors and 
health screenings, may indirectly affect their financial capital, 
insofar as they receive benefits without having to purchase the 
goods or services on their own; and
•  removing graffiti from buildings and signs, repairing streetlights, 
filling potholes, and sealing vacant houses are evident investments 
into the neighborhood’s built capital.  
Unlike Low Road government interventions in distressed 
neighborhoods that focus exclusively on financial and built 
capital—e.g., fines for blighting conditions and tax incentives 
for development projects—the revamped clean sweep at least 
implicitly embraces a need for strategic investments into multiple, 
interdependent dimensions of community wealth, particularly the 
nonmonetary and the intangible. What is more, these investments 
are made simultaneously, and are then followed-up by additional 
post-intervention attempts to cultivate local social, cultural, and 
political capital. 
Mayor Byron Brown and Buffalo 
Police participating in ‘Coffee with 
a Cop’ day.
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In short, whereas the clean sweep started as a top-down, command-
and-control exercise of police power that sanctioned unwanted 
behaviors through monetary fines and related punishments,69 it 
ostensibly became a more bottom-up community development 
initiative aimed at integrating disempowered residents into an 
ongoing process of community wealth-building.70 Out with the old 
[system], in with the next system. 
Outcomes: Changes in Crime and Blight (Warning: 
Contains Technical Content) 
The description from the previous section tells a nice story, but 
where is the evidence that the clean sweep program is building 
community wealth? 
To begin answering this question, observe that the City’s self-
proclaimed, one-line mission for the clean sweep is “to eliminate 
blight and further reduce crime to record lows, while providing 
needed social services.”71 It is therefore useful to start by examining 
the extent to which clean sweeps decrease blight and crime, and 
to engage with the importance of decreasing crime and blight for 
community wealth. With respect to the latter, there is convincing 
empirical research to suggest that neighborhood crime levels, and 
localized fears of crime, are linked to poor mental and physical 
health, as well as lower quality of life.72 In other words, high levels 
of crime are drains on community wealth and well-being. The same 
goes for high levels of blight. Namely, research shows that increases 
in blight, where blight is an indicator of disinvestment into a place’s 
built capital,73 tend to correlate with decreases in financial74 and 
social75 capital. With fewer capital assets with which to combat the 
spread of blight, the phenomenon grows and places further strain—
and downward pressure—on a community’s various assets.76 In 
that sense, strategies designed to concurrently (1) stop blight from 
spreading within a community, and (2) remove existing conditions 
of blight from the community, have the potential to eliminate critical 
feedback effects that lead to downward spiraling in community 
wealth.77 
That’s all a long way of saying: blight and crime are barriers to 
community wealth-building, and eliminating them or substantially 
reducing their footprints can facilitate growth in various forms of 
community capital. In other words, while eliminating blight and 
...high levels of 
crime are drains on 
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crime might not build community wealth directly; doing so creates 
enabling conditions for wealth-building. Likewise, when residents 
are included in the process of eliminating blight and crime, as is the 
case with the revamped clean sweep, it is possible that the social 
connections forged and/or the information gained during that 
process might serve as new sources of community wealth moving 
forward. 
So…has the new clean sweep program been successful at 
reducing crime? Maybe, but it’s difficult to say for sure.
According to City officials, the clean sweep has played a meaningful 
role in reducing the City’s overall crime rate. Since the program was 
taken over by the Brown administration, crime in the City dropped 
by more than 25 percent. In 2015, the information technology 
publication Computerworld recognized Mayor Brown and the 
City with a “Data + Editors’ Choice” Award, citing the apparent link 
between the revamped clean sweep program and crime reduction in 
Buffalo.78 However, it must be remembered that correlation does not 
equal causation, and that not all neighborhoods have experienced 
drops in crime.79 Still, observers note that the City’s use of 911 calls 
and related data sources80 to target clean sweep interventions has 
helped to put more “eyes on [targeted] street[s]” in ways that might 
be alleviating issues of crime in some neighborhoods.81
What about blight reduction? Here it is possible to say a bit 
more about impacts thanks to available metrics and prior research. 
According to Cities of Service, a granting organization that recog-
nized Buffalo for its commitment to citizen engagement in 2015, the 
clean sweep program has removed more than 15,000 square feet of 
graffiti to date.82 Further, in any given year, the program invests more 
than 6,000 volunteer hours into beautification projects that impact 
well over 5,000 properties annually,83 resulting in significant debris 
removal, lot clearing, and landscaping. In these respects, it is unde-
niable that the clean sweep eliminates blight from targeted blocks 
during the interventions. However, to what extent are these efforts 
sustainable?
According to two empirical studies that looked at the first full year 
of the revamped clean sweep program (2007) in two City planning 
communities, the likelihood of new property code violations—
where property violations are commonly adopted as indicators of 
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disinvestment or blight in quantitative research84—in targeted areas 
dropped significantly relative to comparable locations.85 Specifically, 
at the individual parcel level, properties that were exposed to clean 
sweeps were about half as likely to be cited for new property code 
violations in the year after a clean sweep compared to all other 
parcels in the same City planning community, after controlling for 
housing tenure, prior violation history, and a handful of block-level 
attributes. At the face block-level, the rate of code violations per 
100 parcels in clean sweep areas before the interventions in one 
City planning community was 3.6 per 100 parcels, compared to 
1.9 violations per 100 parcels in a statistically-matched “control 
group” of face blocks in the same community. In the year following 
the sweeps, the violation rate in the targeted blocks fell to 3.0 per 
100 parcels, whereas the rate in the control group climbed to 4.5 
violations per 100 parcels. The net “treatment effect” of the clean 
sweep, researchers estimated, was therefore a meaningful swing 
of 3.2 violations per 100 parcels.86 In less jargony terms, the clean 
sweep appeared to reduce the presence and spread of blight on 
targeted blocks in at least two City planning communities, even as 
blighting conditions increased in surrounding areas.
That being said, the foregoing empirical evidence comes from 
analyses of clean sweeps that were carried out in 2007. Are the 
sweeps still performing these blight-reduction functions? 
While there are no published studies at present that look at more 
recent clean sweep impacts on blight, the City of Buffalo, through 
its Open Data portal,87 currently provides geographic data on clean 
sweeps88 and calls for service placed through its non-emergency 
311 system.89 With respect to the latter, 311 “provides [residents] 
with fast, centralized access to city services”, and allows them to 
“[r]egister complaints, get information, and access non-emergency 
police services.”90 Accordingly, it is possible to integrate the two 
datasets to study resident complaints before and after the most 
recent clean sweeps for which data are available. In cases where 
clean sweeps are linked to reductions in blight-related complaints, 
there may be additional—and more up-to-date—evidence for the 
impacts of the program. Toward that end, Figure 2 maps the 
locations of all clean sweeps that were performed in 2015-16, which 
is the latest time period for which clean sweep data are available 
on the City’s Open Data portal. In total, 19 of the City’s 35 planning 
neighborhoods received at least one sweep between 2015 and 2016. 91 
...the clean sweep 
appeared to reduce 
the presence and 
spread of blight on 
targeted blocks in 
at least two City 
planning communities, 
even as blighting 
conditions increased in 
surrounding areas.
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FIGURE 2
Clean sweep locations, 2015-16 (note: sweep locations are shown as street centerlines; a 100-foot buffer was applied to 
those centerlines to identify parcels that were impacted by a sweep)
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 In order to explore the possibility that the clean sweeps shown 
in Figure 2 were associated with reductions in blight-related 
complaints,92 it is necessary to define the latter term. For the 
purposes of this report, eight complaint types from the 311 dataset 
were deemed to be relevant to blight:
•  Building maintenance complaints
•  Graffiti complaints
•  Housing violation complaints
•  Illegal dumping (unspecified location) complaints
•  Illegal dumping (curb) complaints
•  Illegal dumping (private property) complaints
•  Illegal dumping (street) complaints
•  Quality of life complaints
Table 1 summarizes the before-and-after blight complaint rates 
per 100 parcels, by location on a clean sweep block, for all 19 
neighborhoods where clean sweeps were conducted between 
2015 and 2016 (Fig. 2). Overall, the results are mixed and 
subject to different interpretations. Namely, in roughly half of the 
neighborhoods, blocks that received clean sweeps experienced what 
can be termed a negative “treatment effect” in their rates of blight-
related complaints—that is, the rate at which residents registered 
blight complaints in clean sweep blocks decreased relative to other 
blocks in their same planning neighborhoods. Thus, to the extent 
that fewer complaints mean fewer blighting conditions on the 
ground, the negative values in the “Treatment Effect” column might 
be interpreted positively—i.e., the clean sweeps helped to reduce 
blight, a major barrier to wealth-building, in some neighborhoods.
Consistent with the earlier findings, then, it is possible that clean 
sweeps were linked to blight reductions in nine of nineteen 
neighborhoods. What about the other ten neighborhoods? Here, 
admittedly, the interpretation is a bit trickier. On one hand, the 
positive values in the “Treatment Effect” column in Table 1 mean 
that the rate at which residents registered blight complaints in 
clean sweep blocks increased relative to all other blocks in their 
respective planning neighborhoods. Using the same logic as 
...it is possible 
that clean sweeps 
were linked to 
blight reductions 
in nine of nineteen 
neighborhoods.
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above, that result could mean that conditions of blight became 
relatively more severe in clean sweep target areas after the 
intervention—far from a positive, wealth-building outcome. On 
the other hand, higher complaint rates could plausibly occur if 
pre-existing blighting conditions, which had gone unreported, were 
eventually reported by residents after they participated in a clean 
sweep. Such circumstances might play out if residents previously 
felt disempowered—e.g., they felt that reporting an issue would 
not lead to resolution—or if they were unaware of the processes 
and channels available to them for registering complaints. If 
clean sweeps had a hand in increasing resident participation 
in local governance in this way, then even without evidence of 
blight reduction, the interventions could be interpreted as having 
made a positive impact on community wealth. After all, recall 
that community development is about integrating disempowered 
residents into local political and economic affairs (see above). 
That being said, it is not possible to infer from Table 1, at least 
conclusively, that resident participation in the ten neighborhoods 
increased as a result of the clean sweep. For that reason, the next 
subsection looks to a different metric of civic participation: voting 
in local elections. Prior to moving on, however, it is worth noting 
here that, based on the data and literature reviewed in this section, 
there is mixed, but largely affirmative, evidence that the revamped 
clean sweep initiative is reducing barriers to wealth-building (namely, 
crime and blight) in targeted areas.
...there is mixed, but 
largely affirmative, 
evidence that the 
revamped clean sweep 
initiative is reducing 
barriers to wealth-
building (namely, crime 
and blight) in targeted 
areas.
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TABLE 1: RATE OF BLIGHT-RELATED COMPLAINTS (PER 100 PARCELS) BEFORE AND AFTER RECENT CLEAN SWEEPS*
BEFORE AFTER RESULTS
NEIGHBORHOOD SWEEP NO 
SWEEP









11.17 9.57 1.60 10.28 8.19 2.10 0.50 Slight relative 
increase
Elmwood Bidwell 11.11 18.96 -7.85 27.78 11.35 16.43 24.27 Large relative 
increase
Elmwood Bryant 14.22 11.17 3.05 11.28 9.29 1.99 -1.06 Slight relative 
decrease
Fillmore-Leroy 19.41 17.98 1.43 21.73 18.45 3.28 1.85 Slight relative 
increase
Fruit Belt 7.49 6.33 1.16 9.47 8.09 1.38 0.22 Slight relative 
increase
Genesee-Moselle 12.77 12.79 -0.02 9.65 9.96 -0.31 -0.29 Slight relative 
decrease
Hamlin Park 16.74 17.94 -1.20 26.15 15.89 10.26 11.46 Large relative 
increase
Kenfield 19.29 13.77 5.53 23.51 15.38 8.13 2.60 Slight relative 
increase
Kensington Bailey 15.57 13.98 1.59 18.16 16.02 2.14 0.56 Slight relative 
increase
Lovejoy 18.78 14.43 4.35 23.32 16.18 7.14 2.79 Slight relative 
increase
Masten Park 8.16 8.35 -0.19 13.56 8.32 5.24 5.43 Slight relative 
increase
MLK Park 18.70 8.69 10.01 16.24 8.94 7.30 -2.71 Slight relative decrease
North Park 15.32 9.47 5.85 10.48 9.15 1.34 -4.51 Slight relative 
decrease
Pratt-Willert 41.67 8.09 33.58 25.00 8.09 16.91 -16.67 Large relative 
decrease
Riverside 16.60 16.18 0.42 10.55 20.07 -9.53 -9.95 Large relative 
decrease




17.19 12.09 5.10 12.81 13.30 -0.49 -5.58 Slight relative 
decrease
Upper West Side 33.50 16.58 16.92 33.25 19.65 13.60 -3.33 Slight relative 
decrease
West Side 22.67 18.14 4.53 14.44 12.34 2.11 -2.42 Slight relative 
decrease
*”Before” refers to the two-year annual average complaint rate (per 100 parcels) immediately prior to the clean sweeps (2013-14), and “after” 
refers to the two-year annual average complaint rate (per 100 parcels) immediately after the sweeps (2017-18)
**The “treatment effect” is the difference in the before-and-after differences between blocks that received a clean sweep and all other blocks 
in the planning neighborhood. “Large” is arbitrarily defined as a change of at least +/-10 violations/100 parcels 
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Outcomes: Changes in Political Participation 
(Warning: Contains Technical Content)
Political participation, especially in local elections, is regularly linked 
with the concept of local social capital (Fig. 1). While scholars have 
variously and inconsistently considered voter turnout to be both an 
indicator93 and an outcome94 of social capital, the broader and more 
pertinent point is that local electoral participation is an observable 
form of civic engagement. Voting shows an interest in local affairs 
and a concern for the future of the place in which a voter lives. 
In that sense, regardless of whether it is cause or consequence, 
local electoral participation is inextricably linked with the intangible 
forms of capital that contribute to a community’s wealth (see Fig. 
1). Accordingly, it is useful to investigate possible associations 
between clean sweeps—as prospective wealth-building community 
development interventions—and local voter turnout. 
Figure 3 presents the results of a statistical analysis that looked 
at voter turnout in the local general elections immediately before 
(2013) and after (2017) the 2015-16 clean sweeps (see Appendix for 
technical details of the analysis). To examine the possible effects 
of the clean sweeps on turnout, data on registered voters were 
geocoded so that each voter was represented as a point on a map 
based on their home address. Registered voters located in clean 
sweep impact areas95 were then compared to all other registered 
voters in their respective planning neighborhoods. Using these 
data, the analysis computed the probability that a given voter would 
participate in the 2013 and 2017 City of Buffalo municipal elections. 
Only voters who were eligible to vote in both of these elections were 
included in the analysis. The results suggest that turnout probability 
changed meaningfully in nine of the 19 neighborhoods where clean 
sweeps were performed. The change was positive in five of those 
neighborhoods (i.e., the clean sweep appeared to increase turnout 
probability) and negative in the remaining four neighborhoods (i.e., 
the clean sweep was associated with a drop in turnout probability). 
Table 2 summarizes these results using the same format that was 
employed for the blight complaint analysis in the preceding section.
The pattern of changes in local turnout probability for voters on 
blocks that received clean sweeps relative to all other voters in 
their planning neighborhoods may help with interpreting the mixed 
results from the blight complaint analysis above. In particular, 
Voting shows an 
interest in local affairs 
and a concern for the 
future of the place in 
which a voter lives. 
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comparing the results shown in Figure 3 and Table 2 with those 
from Table 1 reveals that in the five planning neighborhoods where 
clean sweeps were linked to large relative increases in voting 
probability (Table 2), resident-initiated blight complaints also 
increased (Table 1). Thus, the earlier interpretation that some clean 
sweeps might have been linked with greater resident propensity to 
report neighborhood concerns to the City’s 311 call center appears 
to hold water. That is, the fact that both blight complaints and voter 
participation increased in certain clean sweep target areas, relative 
to their surroundings, appears to suggest that residents who were 
exposed to clean sweeps became more active in local governance96 
following that exposure. Stated more simply, in at least five of 
Buffalo’s planning neighborhoods, there is convincing circumstantial 
evidence that clean sweeps led to sustained increases in resident 
civic participation.
As for the four planning neighborhoods where residents who were 
exposed to clean sweeps became notably less likely than their 
neighbors to vote in local elections (Table 2), the waters are once 
again muddy. Three of those four neighborhoods experienced 
relative drops in blight complaints compared to their surroundings 
(Table 1), while one neighborhood (Hamlin Park) saw blight 
complaints increase. For the latter, growing blight complaints 
coupled with lower odds of voting could plausibly indicate 
dissatisfaction with responses to complaints. In other words, if 
residents are registering more and more complaints but feel that 
the complaints are not leading to desired results, then they might 
lose confidence in local government and abstain from voting. Such 
a possibility warrants investigation that goes beyond the scope of 
this report. For the other three neighborhoods, where clean sweeps 
were associated with fewer blight complaints and lower turnout 
probabilities, an opposite scenario might be unfolding. Namely, it 
is possible that the clean sweeps and their follow-up activities led 
directly to less blight in the neighborhoods, which, in turn, might 
have appeased local residents. If such pacification occurred, then 
residents might have been less motivated to vote. Once again, 
such a possibility is outside the bounds of this report and requires 
follow-up investigation.
In at least five of 
Buffalo’s planning 
neighborhoods, 
there is convincing 
circumstantial 
evidence that clean 
sweeps led to 
sustained increases 
in resident civic 
participation.
Note: only voters who were 
residing at the same address 
and eligible to vote in both 
elections were included in the 
analysis to better isolate the 
effects, if any, that the clean 
sweep might have had on local 
residents. In other words, all 
voters included in the analysis 
were living on the targeted 
blocks at the time of the clean 
sweeps, and their local voting 
behavior was observable both 
before and after their exposure 
to the sweeps.
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FIGURE 2
Changes in local turnout probabilities, by neighborhood, following clean sweep interventions
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 TABLE 2: EXPECTED PROBABILITY OF VOTING IN A LOCAL ELECTION BEFORE AND AFTER RECENT CLEAN SWEEPS*
BEFORE AFTER RESULTS
NEIGHBORHOOD SWEEP NO 
SWEEP









16.3% 27.9% -11.5% 22.0% 29.6% -7.6% 4.0% Large relative 
increase
Elmwood Bidwell 10.6% 34.1% -23.4% 35.7% 48.7% -13.0% 10.4% Large relative 
increase
Elmwood Bryant 16.1% 37.1% -21.0% 29.3% 48.3% -18.9% 2.0% Slight relative 
increase
Fillmore-Leroy 35.3% 30.7% 4.7% 38.5% 29.6% 8.9% 4.3% Large relative 
increase
Fruit Belt 32.1% 31.7% 0.5% 36.2% 34.4% 1.8% 1.3% Slight relative 
increase
Genesee-Moselle 24.2% 24.3% -0.2% 21.2% 24.4% -3.1% -2.9% Large relative 
decrease
Hamlin Park 30.8% 35.2% -4.4% 27.6% 40.1% -12.5% -8.1% Large relative 
decrease
Kenfield 22.2% 25.7% -3.5% 25.1% 29.7% -4.6% -1.1% Slight relative 
decrease
Kensington Bailey 23.2% 27.9% -4.7% 27.2% 33.3% -6.1% -1.4% Slight relative 
decrease
Lovejoy 21.7% 24.3% -2.6% 28.1% 26.7% 1.3% 3.9% Large relative 
increase
Masten Park 32.0% 29.8% 2.2.% 34.7% 32.7% 2.0% -0.2% Virtually no 
change
MLK Park 27.0% 28.0% -1.0% 27.0% 29.2% -2.2% -1.2% Slight relative decrease
North Park 27.3% 31.6% -4.3% 41.1% 46.3% -5.2% -0.9% Virtually no 
change
Pratt-Willert 27.5% 34.6% -7.1% 29.7% 38.8% -9.1% -2.0% Slight relative 
decrease
Riverside 16.4% 21.0% -4.6% 17.9% 25.5% -7.6% -3.0% Large relative 
decrease




26.0% 26.1% 0.0% 37.8% 36.1% 1.7% 1.7% Slight relative 
increase
Upper West Side 28.6% 21.2% 7.4% 31.5% 27.3% 4.2% -3.3% Slight relative 
decrease
West Side 19.5% 23.9% -4.4% 22.6% 31.9% -9.3% -4.9% Large relative 
decrease
*”Before” refers to the local election immediately prior to the clean sweeps (2013), and “after” refers to the local election immediately after the 
sweeps (2017)
**The “treatment effect” is the difference in the before-and-after probability differences between blocks that received a clean sweep and all 
other blocks in the planning neighborhood. “Large” is defined as statistical significance at an 80% confidence level or better (denoted with 
bold text)
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In Conclusion…Instructive Inconclusion
The evidence summarized in the preceding sections makes it 
clear that the revamped clean sweep program in Buffalo, NY is no 
cure-all for spatial inequality. While there are documented examples 
of the intervention reducing blight in some neighborhoods,97 and 
potentially increasing civic participation in others (see above), such 
outcomes have not occurred evenly or uniformly across all clean 
sweep target areas. Still, even in cases characterized by inconclusive 
empirical results, valuable and instructive policy implications can 
emerge—and this case is no exception. Indeed, above and beyond 
the scattered signs of wealth-building and removal of barriers to 
wealth-building identified in the data, the clean sweep case ably 
demonstrates that local governments can break out of policy inertia 
to radically transform existing programs, in the here and now, in 
ways that supplant Low Road goals of private capital accumulation 
with High Road goals of upwardly spiraling community wealth. 
Specifically, recall that the clean sweep program began as a 
top-down effort to sanction unwanted phenomena, especially 
physical blight and decay, that make some urban communities 
“difficult to develop.”98 It was seen at the time as an “overzealous 
exercise of police power”99 that met with resident fear100 and 
backlash.101 Since that time, however, inclusion of community-based 
organizations (among other entities) and a greater focus on process 
has transformed the clean sweep into a celebrated intervention102 
that aims to build public trust,103 empower local residents,104 and 
invest simultaneously into multiple forms of community capital.105 
What, if any, lessons can this transformation offer public officials 
and change-makers beyond the boundaries of this specific case?
Lessons for Practice
To reiterate, Buffalo’s clean sweep is not a panacea, nor is it an 
unambiguous success story in community wealth-building and/or 
systems-change. It is, however, an example of a local government 
taking an incremental step away from pro-growth, business-as-usual 
policymaking, and toward a pro-community, “next system” where 
public resources are invested in local assets rather than used as 
bait to lure outside economic interests into a neighborhood. Such 
an incremental step shows a willingness and ability to replace—or 
at least modify—deeply entrenched mental models that guide public 
decision-making. This section argues that there are at least five 
...the clean sweep case 
ably demonstrates 
that local governments 
can break out of policy 
inertia to radically 
transform existing 
programs.
...outcomes have not 
occured evenly or 
uniformly across all 
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interrelated spheres in which the City of Buffalo seemed to make 
these modifications in order to overhaul the clean sweep program. 
Collectively, these five changes can serve as loose guidelines for 
revamping existing local government policy instruments in and 
beyond Buffalo. Figure 4 provides a graphical summary of these 
guidelines at the end of this section.
Philosophy: Market-Fundamentalist                            
Interventionist
At the core of what is sometimes termed the “American model 
of urban development” is a pro-market philosophy that sees 
local governments as competitors that attempt to “win” private 
development projects. In this view, local governments take on the 
role of place champions, seeking to promote their cities and—when 
necessary—hand over public resources (e.g., subsidies or tax 
incentives) in order to attract development.106 Aside from these 
entrepreneurial activities, local governments are said to show 
preference for market-based outcomes—that is, they prefer a 
“hands-off” approach that allows the market to dictate development 
patterns. 
In contrast to the “hands off” philosophy of economic development, 
the “hands on,” or interventionist, philosophy of community 
development holds that inequity needs to be stamped out with 
action. In this view, it is not enough to simply cite or fine activities 
that contribute to neighborhood distress (e.g., blight) and then wait 
passively for wealth to build. Rather, it is necessary to actively build 
community wealth and to empower residents to do the same. The 
clean sweep program underwent this shift in philosophy when it 
changed hands to a new Mayoral administration that now uses it to 
“combat hopelessness in the city’s most challenged neighborhoods 
by showing [residents] that the government…is actively working to 
improve their lives.”107
Goals: Private Capital  Community Wealth
One of the most common justifications for aggressive command-
and-control enforcement of property codes is that substandard 
property conditions (i.e., blighting factors) reduce nearby property 
values. Diminished property values, in turn, make neighborhoods 
less likely to attract private (re)investment. When a neighborhood’s 
In contrast to the 
“hands off” philosophy 
of economic 
development, the 
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image is corrupted in this way, incentives to maintain property are 
lowered ever further, which leads to growing levels of blight over 
time. By strictly enforcing property codes, governments aim to fend 
off these vicious cycles, protect property values, and, in doing so, 
create supporting conditions for property (re)investment and (re)
development.108 In other words, the goal is to facilitate the increase 
of private property values. A neighborhood is seen as a mere 
collection of its parts, and the summed total of property values 
within the neighborhood is the target variable to be maximized. 
Shifting away from this goal of private capital accumulation, the 
overhauled clean sweep program now seemingly works toward 
a goal of collective community wealth-building. As argued above, 
the intervention implicitly makes investments into all seven forms 
of community capital (Fig. 1). In that sense, neighborhoods are 
greater than the sums of their parts—they are characterized by 
visible and latent assets, which, when connected, reinforced, and 
mobilized, have the potential to affect positive, lasting, sustainable 
community change. This latter observation leads directly to the third 
fundamental shift in urban policy mental models.
Community Assets: Absent  Latent
Conventional approaches to economic development109 and 
urban planning110 tend to be technocratic and “rational.” That is, 
they diagnose “problems” and seek to implement expert-devised 
“solutions” to those problems in purportedly neutral and objective 
ways. Mid-20th Century urban renewal was an extreme example 
of this sort of “evangelical”111  approach to urban governance. 
In cities throughout the U.S., local governments declared entire 
neighborhoods to be blighted—effectively devoid of assets—and 
ordered that they be razed and replaced with more “modern” 
developments.112 Whereas contemporary development strategies 
do not go quite this far, it is still common practice to diagnose some 
neighborhoods as lacking assets and needing external assistance. 
As argued above, the desire to assist local communities (an 
interventionist local government philosophy) can play an important 
role in building community wealth. However, if that external 
assistance is foisted on local communities that do not want it, 
or if it steamrolls over community voices in pursuit of “expert” 
solutions (somewhat literally, in the case of urban renewal), then 
...neighborhoods are 
greater than the sums 
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that intervention might end up subtracting from—rather than 
adding to—community wealth. Arguably the most effective way to 
avoid such an outcome is to acknowledge that all communities, 
no matter how “distressed” they might appear to be to “experts,” 
possess varying degrees of at least seven types of community 
assets (see Fig. 1). Far from seeing places as devoid of assets 
and in need of external investments, an asset-based approach 
to community development takes the position that communities’ 
internal assets might be obscured from view, but they are there. 
Successful interventions will connect, build on, and mobilize 
those assets, rather than try to substitute for or replace them with 
outside investments. By reallocating significant time and resources 
toward involving residents in sweeps and attempting to create and 
support the functioning of local block clubs (especially after initial 
interventions), the revised clean sweep program supplanted earlier 
assumptions that neighborhoods lacked internal ability to solve 
problems with notions that better connections between residents, 
as well as between residents and local government, can unleash the 
neighborhood’s latent internal capacity to effect positive community 
change.
Orientation: Outcome  Process
In addition to its common assumption that certain neighborhoods 
lack assets and therefore require outside experts to craft and 
implement solutions to local problems, rational, technocratic 
policymaking tends to prioritize outcomes over process, or ends 
over means. Put differently, what matters is that the expert-
prescribed solution gets implemented, not how the implementation 
occurs. 
Prior to its overhaul, Buffalo’s clean sweep program was critiqued on 
multiple occasions for its implementation process. One resident was 
quoted as saying that while she thought the City should intervene 
and clean up her neighborhood, “because [the neighborhood is] 
poor, [City officials assume they] don’t have to do it the right way.”113 
Other community leaders noted that the intervention would only be 
successful if it were not a “one-time thing”, but instead a “year-round 
effort” (which, at the time, it was not).114 Legal experts observed 
that the sweep employed “police-state tactics” that disrespected115 
and intimidated minority residents.116 Yet, despite these critiques, 
City officials maintained that the clean sweep’s “crack down on 
Successful 
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and mobilize those 
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try to substitute for 
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quality-of-life problems” was improving targeted neighborhoods 
and ultimately worth what one Council Member called “a little 
inconvenience for three hours.”117 In other words, the non-expert 
residents and observers who disagreed with the process should 
nonetheless be satisfied because the program was delivering its 
intended results.
When the clean sweep program was taken over by the Brown 
administration in 2006, some observers voiced holdover concerns 
about the “surprise” nature of the events and the lack of authentic 
public participation.118 Since that time, however, the administration 
has made and continues to make strides toward a more inclusive 
and democratic clean sweep process. The program now dedicates 
substantive City staff time to after-action efforts in clean sweep 
communities aimed at building local social and political capital. In 
addition, the City now seeks initial buy-in from existing block clubs 
and neighborhood associations, and works closely with these 
groups to carry out sweeps.119 Most recently, the City has instructed 
the police officers involved in sweeps to wear less intimidating, 
dressed-down uniforms “similar to…bike patrol attire,” and to engage 
more often and on friendlier terms with residents of targeted 
blocks.120 As part of that engagement, officers, who now play soccer 
with neighborhood children during sweeps, have volunteered to hold 
“weekly soccer clinics that would bring the same…officers to the 
same locations on a regular basis”—“something the kids [can] count 
on and look forward to,” according to recent media coverage of the 
program.121 While results still matter, the City has taken great strides 
to make sure that the means are at least as important as the ends.
Residents: Subjects  Local Experts
The shift in orientation from “only outcomes matter” to “outcomes 
need to be created by an appropriate process” overlaps with the fifth 
and final instructive shift examined in this section: the shift from 
a conceptualization of residents as non-expert subjects to one of 
resident as local experts who are potential partners in community 
governance. 
Rational, technocratic planning and policymaking tends to assume 
that residents lack both the specialized knowledge and the capacity 
to effect positive community change. Too often, residents are 
assumed to be unaware of what is in their own best interests, and 
...the City has taken 
strides to make sure 
that the means are at 
least as important as 
the ends.
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to be altogether uninterested in participating in public affairs. At the 
same time, non-participation in events such as public forums or 
meetings of a local legislative body is conflated with acquiescence 
and wholesale agreement with top-down characterizations of local 
problems and preferred solutions.122 For example, in the early history 
of the clean sweep, officials made claims like “most [residents] were 
pleased” with the intervention,123 despite direct contradictions from 
residents who say they were neither interviewed nor asked about 
their opinions, and who felt violated by the events.124 Complaints 
were written off by City officials as coming from “the same people 
who have contributed to many of the problems…in the first place,” 
essentially rendering all complaints invalid.125 In other words, the 
City knew what was best for the neighborhood, regardless of what 
the residents said.
An alternative view of residents sees them as the foremost experts 
on local neighborhood conditions in light of their lived experiences. 
It sees residents not as un- or dis-interested in public participation, 
but as facing multiple, uneven and intersecting barriers to civic 
involvement. Instead of prescribing what is best for these residents 
and their neighborhoods (and proscribing what isn’t), “next system” 
planning and policymaking turns its attention toward aggressively 
removing participation barriers in order to learn as much as 
possible from resident-experts about the assets and challenges 
that are present in their communities—and to understand how 
existing assets might be reinforced and mobilized to overcome 
resident-identified challenges. Although it still has plenty of room 
for improvement, the revamped clean sweep program has placed 
increasing emphasis on bolstering resident participation and 
partnering with residents to enhance quality of life in targeted 
neighborhoods. New commitments to repeated, face-to-face 
interaction with residents in their neighborhoods following clean 
sweep interventions126 has the potential to build public trust and 
confidence in government, and to identify strategies for reducing 
barriers to resident participation in broader community affairs.127 
To be sure, recall from above that there is preliminary evidence of 
growing civic participation in some—but not all—of the communities 
where recent clean sweeps have taken place. 
In this view residents 
are seen as the 
foremost experts on 
local neighborhood 
conditions in light of 
their lived experiences.
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In sum, by retooling them to feature (1) democratic and inclusive 
participatory processes, wherein (2) residents are treated and 
engaged as respected local experts who (3) live in communities 
that contain visible and latent stocks of at least seven types of local 
assets (Fig. 1), (4) public interventions that (5) set goals of building 
collective community wealth via consensual and context-sensitive 
means are well-positioned to effect positive community change—
even in neighborhoods that appear to experts to be distressed.128 
Figure 4 summarizes these High Road—or “next system”—guiding 
policy principles for Erasing Red Lines, and pushing back against 







•  Market based
•  Promotes competition
•  Hands-on
•  Interventionist
•  Promotes cooperation
•  Private capital 
accumulation
•  Economic growth
•  Collective wealth 
building
•  Community development
•  Absent from distressed 
communities
•  Need to come from the 
outside
•  Latent, present in all 
communities
•  Available to be 
connected, reinforced, 
and mobilized
•  Oriented toward desired 
outcome
•  End more important than 
means
•  Technocratic and expert-
driven
•  Process-oriented
•  Means of equal or 
greater importance than 
ends
•  Democratic and inclusive
•  Subjects; clients; non-
experts
•  Uninterested in active 
public participation
•  Local experts and 
potential partners
•  Faced with multiple, 
intersecting barriers to 
participation
THE LOW ROAD THE HIGH ROAD
FIGURE 4 Changing systems as changing lanes: Five exits off the Low Road
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CONCLUSION
It would be easy to point fingers and assign blame for persistent Red Lines of urban decline to the 
powerful 1930s and 1940s policymakers and financial professionals who actually drew some of those 
lines, and who therefore helped to create and reinforce gulfing patterns of spatial inequality across the 
United States129…but doing so fails to engage with deeper systemic issues that allowed those “powerful” 
interests to accumulate and exercise disproportionate shares of power in the first place. Put differently, 
trying to figure out whether to fault the captain or the builder from the deck of a sinking ship is not going 
to change one’s immediate circumstances. Finger-pointing might feel good, but it won’t rescue any 
of the passengers from going under water. The challenge thus becomes one part thinking outside of 
the system that generated the problem; and one part prefiguring a “next system,” in the here and now, 
with available resources. (That deck chair might not be a boat, but if it allows us to stay afloat until we 
successfully devise a way to make it to shore, then let’s use it.) 
While leading community-based organizations are prefiguring a more democratic and equitable 
economy in specific locations through radical transformations to social spaces such as housing and 
work,130 local governments often appear to be behind the curve, locked-in to policies and programs that 
prop up the status quo. The clean sweep program in Buffalo, NY offers an emerging example of how 
local governments can break this stasis, and substantially overhaul an existing policy program to focus 
not on economic growth or increasing private property values; but on investing into multiple, tangible and 
intangible streams of collective community wealth (Fig. 1). Although the program retained its original 
name and some of its original intent, meaningful shifts in philosophy, goals, orientation, and views of 
residents and community assets (Fig. 4) have seemingly helped the clean sweep to win broader public 
acceptance, reduce barriers to community wealth-building, and make substantive connections between 
and investments into different forms of community capital. The true test going forward will be for the 
City—and for local governments across the map—to embrace these shifts in all aspects of program 
development, implementation, and evaluation. Occasional incremental steps toward next systems are 
welcome departures from the status quo; but truly walking the High Road is a constant uphill march that 
is sure to come to an unceremonious end unless we figure out how to make the journey as a society, 
supporting and encouraging one another along the way. 
Appendix
All of the original analyses performed in this report relied on data available from the City of Buffalo’s 
Open Data Portal (https://data.buffalony.gov/  [refer to notes 87-91]) and the New York State (NYS) 
Board of Elections (BOE) (https://www.elections.ny.gov). 
To perform the analysis of voter turnout, a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request was made to the 
NYS BOE in August 2019. That request produced a database of all voters in New York State that included 
registered voter addresses and voter histories. Using mailing addresses, 301,0126 voter records were 
successfully matched to the City of Buffalo boundaries via a geocoding process in Esri ArcGIS 10.7.1. 
The next step was to reduce the dataset to only those voters who were (1) actively registered and 
eligible to participate in both local general elections of interest (2013 and 2017), and (2) located in a 
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City planning neighborhood where a clean sweep was performed between 2015 and 2016. In total, 
70,672 voter records satisfied these criteria. Table A1 breaks those voters down by their home planning 
neighborhood and location relative to a 2015-16 clean sweep. 
TABLE A1: COUNT OF VOTERS INCLUDED IN THE STATISTICAL ANALYSES, BY PLANNING NEIGHBORHOOD
NEIGHBORHOOD BOCK DID NOT 
RECEIVE A CLEAN 
SWEEP






Elmwood Bidwell 5,784 23 5,807
Elmwood Bryant 4,470 83 4,553
Fillmore-Leroy 2,185 219 2,404
Fruit Belt 1,287 202 1,489
Genesee-Moselle 2,877 414 3,291
Hamlin Park 2,258 472 2,730
Kenfield 2,569 1,192 3,761
Kensington Bailey 5,559 989 6,548
Lovejoy 2,468 255 2,723
Masten Park 2,883 507 3,390
MLK Park 1,564 653 2,217
North Park 7,964 477 8,441
Pratt-Willert 1,918 260 2,178
Riverside 3,303 319 3,622




Upper West Side 2,038 232 2,270
West Side 2,890 258 3,148
TOTAL 62,908 7,764 70,672
The purpose of analyzing voter turnout only for those registered voters who were eligible to participate 
in both local elections was to try to isolate the influence of the clean sweeps on political participation. 
That is, studying the same pool of voters before-and-after the clean sweeps reduces (but certainly does 
not eliminate) the possibility that changes in turnout were caused by unobservable voter attributes, given 
that many of the same unobservable attributes are likely to be present at both time periods. 
Given the samples described above, the analysis drew on instructive literature from housing economics 
to design and estimate statistical models of voter turnout. Specifically, housing researchers have long 
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